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Introduction 
The  European  Community  has  an  increasing  number  of  direct  legal  relations  with 
individuals. Its activities no longer only concern a certain number of economic categories -
such as farmers or professional importers and exporters - but also each individual citizen. 
It is,  therefore, not surprising to see today a demand expressed for the powers which belong 
to  the  Community  to  be  counterbalanced  by  their  formal  subjection  to  clear  and 
well-defined fundamental rights. 
The  Commission  believes  that  the  best  way  of  replying  to  the  need  to  reinforce  the 
protection of fundamental rights  at Community level,  at the present stage, consists in the 
Community formally  adhering to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms  of 4  November  1950  (hereafter  referred  to  as  'the 
European Convention on Human Rights' or 'ECHR'). The Commission in proposing this, 
does  not disregard the fact  that, in  the longer term, the Community should endeavour to 
complete the Treaties by a catalogue of fundamental rights specially adapted to the exercise 
of its  powers. It does  not, however, appear possible to achieve  this  objective in the  short 
term because of the differences  of opinion which exist between the Member States on the 
definition of economic and social  rights.  In  order to reinforce  the  legal  protection of the 
citizens  of the  Community  immediately  and in  the  most  efficient  manner possible,  one 
should rely,  in the first place,  on the fundamental rights  inscribed in the ECHR.  In  other 
words, the  Community should adhere  as  soon as  possible  to this  Convention and to  the 
protection mechanisms which it contains. The elaboration of a catalogue for the Community 
itself would in no way be held up. Accession to the ECHR would constitute on the contrary 
a first step in the direction of that objective. 
The memorandum reaches the conclusion that the accession of the European Community to 
the ECHR seems desirable for a whole series of reasons. None of the difficulties which have 
appeared in  this  context seems  insurmountable.  Given  the dimension of the action to be 
undertaken  and its  complexity,  the  Commission considers  it necessary,  before  setting  in 
motion the appropriate institutional mechanisms, to encourage as profound a discussion as 
possible with all interested bodies on the basis of this memorandum. Part One 
General  remarks 
The  protection of human rights 
and the  Member States 
1.  For  more  than  two  centuries  the  history  of 
Europe has  been characterized by constant efforts 
to  improve  the  protection of fundamental  rights. 
Founded  on  the  human  and  civil  rights 
declarations  of  the  eighteenth  century,  all 
European  constitutions  today  contain  an 
established  body of inviolable fundamental  rights 
and  freedoms.  This  is  particularly  true  of  the 
Member States  of the  European Communities.  In 
contrast  to  the  constitutions  of  some  East 
European countries, the constitutional orders of all 
Member States  not only  recognize  essentially  the 
same  body  of  fundamental  freedoms,  but  also 
~rovide for the judicial enforcement of such rights 
m  the  event  of  violations.  All  Member' States 
aware  of  their  .common  heritage  of  ideas  and 
political  traditions,  ·have,  moreover,  become 
parties  to  international  conventions  on  human 
rights;  in  particular,  they have without exception 
become  parties  to  the  European  Convention  on 
Human Rights. 
The question of the protection of human rights has 
become  increasingly topical in  the last few  years. 
High-level  national  and  European  Courts  have 
delivered important judgments on the safeguarding 
of these  rights.  In  France,  the  Cour de  Cassation 
recently  recognized,  in  a  fundamental  judgment, 
the  validity  in  national  law  of  the  European 
Convention  on  Human  Rights.  1  In  the  United 
Kingdom,  a  Bill  of  Rights  is  envisaged  and  in 
Belgium and the Netherlands also consideration is 
being  given  to  improving  the  protection  of 
fundamental  rights  against  violations  by  the 
legislature.  At  the  Helsinki  Conference,  the 
protection  of  human  rights  was  the  most 
important demand  made  by  the  Western  States· 
the  final  act  of  that  conference  has  awakened 
expectations  in  the  Eastern  bloc  countries  with 
regard to the granting of greater freedom. 
2.  As  far  as  the  European  Communities  in 
particular  are  concerned,  their  Member  States 
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already  declared  when  concluding  the  Treaty 
establishing  the  European  Economic  Community 
that  the  ultimate  aim  of  the  pooling  of  their 
economic  resources  was  to  preserve  peace  and 
liberty.  The guarantee of a  body of fundamental 
rights  and the existence of a  democratic pluralist 
regime  are  among  the  essential  features  of  the 
declaration  of  the  Nine  on  'European  Identity' 
adopted in Copenhagen in 1973 and according to 
which 'they are determined to defend the principles 
of representative democracy, the rule of law, social 
justice - the ultimate goal  of economic progress 
- and  respect  for  human  rights.  All  of  these 
constitute  fundamental  elements  of  European 
Identity'. Both elements also played a  central role 
in  determining  the  attitude  of  the  Community 
towards  European  countries  wishing  to  become 
members.  The  Heads  of  State  or  Government 
solemnly  declared  at  the  European  Council 
meeting  of  8  April  1978  'that  respect  for  and 
maintenance  of  representative  democracy  and 
human rights  in  each  Member State  are essential 
elements  of  membership  of  the  European 
Communities'. 2 
The  protection of human rights 
and the  Community 
3.  The Treaties of Paris and Rome are designed 
primarily as  instruments of economic integration, 
and probably for this reason, but perhaps also on 
account of the  restricted powers  accorded to the 
Community  institutions,  do  not  include  for  the 
Community  its  own  catalogue  of  fundamental 
rights.  Nevertheless,  the  Court of Justice  had  to 
deal  at a relatively early stage with complaints in 
which  it  was  maintained  that  a  particular 
Community  act  violated  a  fundamental  right 
guaranteed by the constitution of a Member State. 
In its desire for uniform application of Community 
law,  the  Court  of Justice  contented  itself in the 
initial stages of its  case law by  declaring in regard 
to such complaints that it was not one of its tasks 
to  ensure  that national  rules  of a  Member State 
were  observed,  even  where  such  rules  were  of a 
1  Cour de Cassation, Judgment of 5 December 1978 in criminal 
proceedings against Cherif Baroum. 
2  Bull. EC 3-1978, Preliminary Chapter. 
s.  2179 constitutional nature. 1  Only from  the end of the 
1960s  could  an  evolution  be  discerned  in  the 
decisions  of  the  Court.  In  two  judgments  of 
principle, in 1969 and 1970, it ruled that respect 
for  fundamental rights formed  an integral part of 
the  general  principles  of law,  the  observance  of 
which the Court had to ensure. The protection of 
these  rights,  while  inspired  by  the  constitutional 
traditions  common  to  the  Member  States,  had 
nevertheless to be ensured within the framework of 
the Community's structure and objectives.  2 
In  subsequent decisions  the  Court of Justice  has 
specified the criteria according to which it intends 
to ensure the protection of fundamental  rights at 
Community  level,  declaring  that  'it  could  not 
accept  measures  incompatible  with  fundamental 
rights  recognized  and  protected  by  the 
constitutions' of Member States. 
4.  The Court of Justice also stated that 'similarly, 
international treaties for the protection of human 
rights,  on  which  the  Member  States  have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can 
supply guidelines which should be followed within 
the framework of Community law'. 3 
This case law of the Court, through which a whole 
series of fundamental rights and general principles 
of  law  have  been  subsequently  recognized  as 
essential  elements  of  the  Community  legal 
order,4  has  been  highly praised  throughout  the 
Community.  The  political  institutions  of  the 
Community supported it in their Joint Declaration 
on fundamental rights of 5 April  1977 5  and have 
repeatedly  stressed  the  prime  importance  they 
attach  to the  method  adopted  by  the  Court for 
developing a  means of protection of fundamental 
rights  which  is  specifically  adapted  to  the 
requirements of the Community. 
5.  Nonetheless, however satisfactory and worthy 
of approval  the  method  developed  by  the  Court 
may  be,  it  cannot  rectify  at  least  one  of  the 
shortcomings  affecting  the  legal  order  of  the 
Communities  through  the  lack  of  a  written 
catalogue of fundamental rights:  the impossibility 
of  knowing  in  advance  which  are  the  liberties 
which  may  not  be  infringed  by  the  Community 
institutions  under  any  circumstances.  The 
European citizen has a legitimate interest in having 
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his  rights  vis-a-vis  the  Community  laid  down  in 
advance. He must be able to assess the prospects of 
any  possible  legal  dispute  from  the  outset  and 
therefore  have  at  his  disposal  clearly  defined 
criteria.  The  fact  that  judgments  which  operate 
only  ex  post  facto  cannot  fully  satisfy  this 
requirement of legal  certainty is  inevitable in  the 
nature of things and in no way implies criticism of 
the Court's approach. 
The decision by the German Federal Constitutional 
Court, in  its  judgment of 29  May 1974, 6  that, so 
long as  there existed  no Community catalogue of 
fundamental  rights  corresponding to the German 
Constitution,  it was  entitled  to  decide  upon  the 
validity  of legal  acts  of the  Community - even 
where  these  had previously  been  declared  lawful 
by  the  Court  of Justice  - in  the  light  of  the 
fundamental  rights  laid  down  in  the  German 
Constitution,  is  certainly  incompatible  with  the 
principle  of  exclusive  power  of  review  by  the 
Court of Justice  and of the  unity of Community 
law,  but also  demonstrates  that at least some  of 
the highest courts in the Member States consider it 
necessary to bind the Community to a written text. 
The Italian Constitutional Court did not go  quite 
so  far  in  its  Judgment  No  183/1973 7  but  did 
none the less  suggest a similar concern. 
The European Parliament and a majority of writers 
on the subject have, like the Commission, criticized 
the decision of the German Federal Constitutional 
Court.  Nevertheless,  there  has  recently  been 
increasing  support  for  the  idea  of  a  written 
'  CJEC  4.  2.  1959  (Case  1/58  Stork  v High  Authority  ( 1959] 
ECR  I:");  CJEC  17.  5.  1960  \Ca'c'  36-38  and  40/59  Ruhr-
kohlcmubufsgescllschJften v High Authurit) ( 1960] ECR 423). 
2  CJEC  12.  11.  1969 (Case 29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm (1969] 
ECR  419);  CJEC  17.  12.  1970  (Case  11/70  lnternationale 
Handelsgesellschaft ( 1970] ECR  1125). 
3  CJEC  14.  5.  1974  (Case  4/73  Nold  v  Commission  (1974] 
ECR  491);  CJEC  28.  10.  1975  (Case  36175  Rutili  v  French 
Minister of the Interior (1975] ECR  1219). 
4  Commission  report  of 4  February  1976  on  the  protection  of 
fundamental rights in  the EuropeJn Community - Supplement 
5176 -Bull. EC. 
5  OJ C 103 of 27. 3.  1977. 
6  BVerfGE 37, 271. 
7  Judgment of 27 December 1973 - Case  183/73  - Frontini 
and associates, GiurisprudenzJ Costituzionale, 1973, 2406; Foro 
Italiano, 1974, I,  315; Giurisprudenza Italiana, 1974, I,  1, 865. 
7 catalogue  of  fundamental  rights  for  the 
Community. 
The  advantages  of  such  a  catalogue  are  not 
contested by  the  Commission, but it is  clear that 
the  process  of drawing it  up  will  be  a  long and 
exacting  task.  If it  were  undertaken  too  hastily, 
there  is  the  fear  that  it  would  bring  to  light 
differences between the Member States particularly 
with regard to economic and social rights, and that 
agreement would be possible only on the basis of 
the  lowest  common  denominator. 1  This  would 
represent a retrograde step compared with the level 
guaranteed by the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities. 
6.  As  a  way  out  of  these  difficulties,  the 
suggestion of accession to the ECHR has been put 
forward  from various  sides,  and in particular on 
the  occasion  of  a  symposium  organized  by  the 
European  Parliament  m  October  1978  m 
Florence. 2 
In its  Report of 4 February 1976 to the European 
Parliament,  the  Commission  declared  that in  its 
view  the  Community  was  already  obliged  to 
observe the human rights embodied in the ECHR 
on the basis  of the decisions of the Court,  but it 
did  not consider it necessary  for  the  Community 
formally  to  accede  to  this  Convention. 3  Closer 
consideration has recently revealed more clearly to 
the  Commission  the  disadvantages  which  arise 
from  the lack of a written catalogue both for the 
image  of the  Community in  general  and for  the 
protection of the rights of the European citizen. As 
a  result,  the  Commission  has  reconsidered  its 
position. It has  considered the legal  and technical 
problems which  would be posed by the accession 
of the Community to the ECHR and it has come to 
the conclusion that there are no obstacles to such a 
step that cannot be overcome. 
7.  After  a  thorough  examination  of  all  the 
arguments, the Commission now recommends the 
formal accession of the Community to the ECHR. 
The decisive  factor in  its view  is  that the  ECHR 
and the protection of fundamental  rights ensured 
by  the  Court  of  Justice  of  the  European 
Communities  essentially  have  the  same  aim, 
namely the protection of a heritage of fundamental 
and human rights considered inalienable by those 
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European States  organized on a  democratic basis. 
The protection of this Western European heritage 
should  ultimately  be  uniform  and  accordingly 
assigned, as  regards the Community also, to those 
bodies set up specifically for this purpose. 
The Commission is  aware that the accession of the 
European Communities to the ECHR will give rise 
to not inconsiderable difficulties on account of the 
Communities'  particular  structure.  Before  it 
submits  appropriate  proposals  to  the  Council, 
therefore, it has considered it expedient to launch a 
discussion  on  the  results  of its  examination  by 
means of this memorandum in accordance with the 
announcement  made  by  its  President  to  the 
European Parliament on 16 November 1978. 
8.  It should be clearly stated from the outset that 
accession  of  the  European  Communities  to  the 
ECHR  does  not  form  an  obstacle  to  the 
preparation of a special Community catalogue, nor 
does it prevent in any way the Court of Justice of 
the  European  Communities  from  further 
developing  its  exemplary  case  law  on  the 
protection  of  fundamental  rights,  which  has 
always  been  welcomed  by  the  Commission.  As 
Article 60 thereof clearly shows, the ECHR is  only 
a minimum code and thus in no way prevents its 
contracting  parties  from  developing  a  more 
extensive  protection  of fundamental  rights.  The 
Court of Justice will therefore remain free not only 
to apply the method which it has developed for the 
Community with a view to defining economic and 
social  fundamental  rights,  which  are  barely 
touched  upon  in  the  ECHR,  but  also  where 
specific  needs  dictate,  to  go  beyond  the  rights 
contained in the ECHR. 
It should also be pointed out that accession to the 
ECHR does not imply any extension of the powers 
of the Community with regard to the protection of 
fundamental  rights,  and that it is  in  no way the 
intention  of  this  memorandum  to  advocate  the 
extension  of  the  powers  of  the  Community 
'  It  should  be  pointed  out  in  this  connection  that  the  first 
attempts  to  incorporate  economic  and  sllcial  rights  in  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  were  not  a  striking 
success. 
2  Sec  Rt'"'lution  of the  Furopc.m  Parliament  of  27. 4.  1979; 
OJ C  127 of 21. 5.  1'179. 
'  Supplement 5/76 - Bull. EC, point 28. 
s.  2179 vis-a-vis  the Member States to cover fundamental 
rights  which  are  not  within  the  scope  of  the 
Community. 
The  European Convention on 
Human Rights and its mode of operation 
9.  Drawn up  within the  Council of Europe,  the 
European  Convention  on  Human  Rights  was 
signed on 4  November 1950 and came into force 
on 3 September 1953. Five protocols were adopted 
later. 
The ECHR has been signed by all  members of the 
Council of Europe, that is  to say all nine Member 
States  of the  Community,  plus  Austria,  Cyprus, 
Greece,  Iceland,  Malta,  Norway,  Portugal, 
Sweden,  Switzerland  and  Turkey  and  recently 
Spain  and Liechtenstein also.  With the exception 
of Spain  and Liechtenstein,  all  these  States  have 
also ratified the Convention. 1 
The  European  Convention  on  Human  Rights 
represents  a  collective  guarantee  at  a  European 
level  of  a  number  of  principles  set  out  in  the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supported 
by  international  judicial  machinery  making 
decisions which must be  respected by  contracting 
States.  This  collective  and international guarantee 
is  not  a  substitute  for  national  guarantees  of 
fundamental rights, but is  supplementary to them. 
Proceedings  under  the  Convention  involve  three 
bodies:  the  European  Commission  of  Human 
Rights, the European Court of Human Rights and 
the  Committee  of  Ministers  of  the  Council  of 
Europe. 
•  The  European  Commission  of Human  Rights 
has mainly a mission of inquiry and conciliation. If 
no  friendly  settlement  has  been  reached  on  the 
basis of respect for human rights, the Commission 
formulates  a  legal  opinion.  The  Commission 
consists  of  a  number  of  members  equal  to  the 
number of contracting parties. These members are 
elected by the Committee of Ministers by absolute 
majority  from  a  list  of names  drawn  up  by  the 
Bureau  of  the  Consultative  Assembly  of  the 
Council  of  Europe;  the  election  is  based  on 
proposals made by each group of representatives in 
the Consultative Assembly. The members, who are 
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elected  for  a  period  of  six  years,  sit  in  the 
Commission  in  their  individual  capacity,  which 
ensures  genuine  independence.  The  Commission 
may  deal  both with  applications  submitted  by  a 
contracting party (Article 24) and with complaints 
made by a person, non-governmental organization 
or  group  of  individuals  (Article 25);  the  latter 
provision  applies,  however,  only in  so  far  as  the 
State  complained of has  expressly  recognized  the 
right of individuals to submit applications. 2 
The Commission decides first on the admissibility 
of  applications.  If  an  application  is  declared 
admissible  and  no  friendly  settlement  can  be 
achieved  between  the  parties,  the  Commission 
draws up a report which includes in particular its 
opinion  as  to  whether  there  is  a  breach  of  the 
ECHR. The case may then be referred to the Court 
within  three  months,  although  only  the  State 
making the application or the State complained of, 
the  State  of  whom  the  person  concerned  is  a 
national  or  the  Commission  of  Human  Rights 
itself are empowered to do this.  If the case  is  not 
referred to the Court, the Committee of Ministers 
has to take a decision. 
•  The  European  Court  of  Human  Rights  is 
competent  to  take  a  judicial  decision  which  is 
binding on the parties to the action on whether in 
a  given  case the Convention has  or has not been 
violated by a contracting State. The Court consists 
of a number of independent judges equal to that of 
the Members of the Council of Europe. They are 
elected by the Consultative Assembly from a list of 
candidates submitted by  the Member States;  each 
Member State may nominate three candidates, of 
whom two at least must be its own nationals. The 
judges are elected for a period of nine years. 
The Court is  competent only if its jurisdiction has 
been  recognized  by  the  contracting  parties 
concerned  (Article  46). 3  The Commission or one 
of the contracting parties may  refer  a  case  to  the 
1  It should  be  noted  however  that  France  has  not signed  the 
additional Protocol No 2 and that Italy and the United Kingdom 
have not yet  ratified Protocol No 4. 
2  France,  Cyprus,  Greece,  Malta  and  Turkey  have  not so  far 
permitted individual applications. 
3  With  the exception of Malta and Turkey all  members of the 
Council of Europe have accepted  the compulsory jurisdiction of 
the  Court.  Spain  and  Liechtenstein  have  not  yet  adopted  a 
position on this point. 
9 Court, but not an individual applicant (Articles 44 
and  48).  It decides  on  the  case  in  question  by 
means of a judgment which is final and may award 
compensation to the injured party. 
•  If the case has  not been  referred to the  Court 
within  three  months  of  the  submission  of  the 
Commission's Report, the Committee of Ministers 
decides by a two-thirds majority whether there has 
been a violation of the ECHR; at the same time it 
prescribes  a  period  during  which  the  State 
concerned  must  take  the  necessary  measures.  If 
that State does not take satisfactory measures, the 
Committee of Ministers has to decide 'what effect 
shall  be given' to its original decision. The ECHR 
contains  no  provisions  on  how  this  should  be 
done;  it  mentions  as  a  form  of  sanction  only 
publication of the Commission's report (Article 32 
(3)).  Many observers consider these quasi-judicial 
powers to be extremely unsatisfactory on account 
of  the  political  nature  of  the  Committee  of 
Ministers. 
The  relationship of the  Community 
to  the  Convention on Human Rights 
on the  basis of the 
present legal position 
10.  Since  1974,  all  the  Member  States  of  the 
Community have  been  contracting parties  to the 
ECHR, which has led  the Court of Justice of the 
European Communities to derive guidelines for the 
constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States  from  the  fundamental  rights  embodied  in 
the  ECHR;  in  other  words  to  use  the  ECHR 
indirectly as  an indicator of the standard existing 
at  Community  level  in  the  field  of fundamental 
rights.  Although  the  Court has  hitherto  avoided 
speaking of the Community being directly  bound 
by  the  catalogue  in  the  ECHR,  there  are  good 
reasons for considering this already to be the case. 
On the one hand the ECHR represents a minimum 
standard  of  the  'general  principles  of  law' 
protected by  the Court of Justice.  On the other, it 
is  arguable  that  the  Community,  in  so  far  as 
powers have  been  assigned  to it by  the Member 
States,  is  already  bound,  on  the  basis  of  the 
principle  of  substitution,  by  the  substantive 
provisions of the Convention on Human Rights by 
reason  of the  original  obligation of the  Member 
States. 
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11.  Since  the  Community  is  not  a  contracting 
party to the ECHR, it seems impossible for it to be 
made the direct object of an application by a State 
or  individual.  Nevertheless,  the  possibility  that 
certain legal acts of the Community could be made 
the subject of proceedings before the Commission 
of Human Rights  or the Court of Human Rights 
cannot be  dismissed a priori. Applicants might be 
above  all  non-member  countries,  which  have  no 
access  to  the  Court  of Justice  of the  European 
Communities  and  natural  or  legal  persons  who 
have lost their case in proceedings before the latter. 
This  last  possibility  materialized  recently;  an 
employees'  association  sought  to  incriminate  all 
the Member States together concerning a  decision 
of  the  Council  refusing  it  the  right  to  be 
represented in the Consultative Committee set up 
by  the ECSC  Treaty.  Admittedly  this  application 
was  dismissed  by  the  Commission  of  Human 
Rights on 10 July  1978 as inadmissible,  but only 
on grounds relating to the particular circumstances 
of that case.  At this  stage  the  possibility  cannot 
be  excluded  that  the  European  Commission  of 
Human Rights or the Court in Strasbourg will one 
day  take a  different  view  of the  question  of the 
collective  responsibility  of  the  Member  States, 
having  regard  in  particular  to  the  consequences 
which the transfer of powers of the Member States 
to the Community implies. 
12.  The  danger  that  Community  acts  will  be 
made  subject  to  control  by  the  Strasbourg 
authorities  without  the  Community  having 
appropriate  means  to  defend  itself  is  evident 
particularly in  those  cases  in  which  the  Member 
States  incorporate  into  national  law  obligations 
under  Community  law  without  having  any 
discretionary powers of their own. A human rights 
complaint would be directed in such cases against 
a  specific  Member  State  and  as  such  would 
therefore be perfectly admissible. The object of the 
complaint would  then  be,  however,  disregarding 
the  possibility  of  any  additional  provisions  not 
specifically  required  under  Community  law,  the 
Community  rule  behind  the  national  act.  The 
situation  with  such  implementing  acts  Is 
particularly  unsatisfactory  inasmuch  as  the 
Member State would certainly be unable to rely on 
the  defence  that  it  was  merely  fulfilling  an 
obligation  under  Community  law,  while  the 
Community,  the  party  ultimately  responsible, 
S.  2/79 would, for its part, have no opportunity to reply to 
the complaints against it. 
13.  Thus, the Community runs the risk under the 
present legal  position that its  legal  acts  could be 
controlled by the Strasbourg authorities as to their 
compatibility  with  the  ECHR,  without  having 
appropriate  means  to  defend  the  Community 
position, while  the Member States  could possibly 
be prevented from applying those acts. 
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Part Two 
Pros and  cons 
Arguments in favour of accession 
The  arguments  in  favour  of  the  Community 
becoming  a  party  to  the  ECHR  may  be 
summarized as  follows: 
Improving  the  image of Europe  as  an 
area of freedom  and democracy 
14.  Accession  to  the  ECHR  would  make  a 
substantial  contribution  to  the  strengthening  of 
democratic  beliefs  and  freedom  both  within  and 
beyond the free  world. Even more than the Joint 
Declaration by the three political institutions 1  of 
5  April  1977  on  the  protection  of fundamental 
rights, 2  it would make clear  to the  whole  world 
that the Community does not merely make politi-
cal  declarations  of  intent  but  is  determined  to 
improve  in  real  terms  the  protection  of human 
rights  by  binding itself to a  written catalogue of 
fundamental freedoms .. 
The accession of the Community to the ECHR is 
completely in line with the declaration made by the 
European Council on democracy on 8 April 1978; 
in  this  declaration  is  was  solemnly  stated  'that 
respect  for  and  maintenance  of  representative 
democracy  and  human  rights  in  each  Member 
State are essential elements of membership of the 
European  Communities'.  If  respect  for  human 
rights  is  for  a  State  an  essential  condition  of 
membership  of the  Community,  then  it  is  only 
logical  to  bind  the  Communities  themselves  to 
respect such rights. 
The  accession  of the  Community  to  the  ECHR 
would  give  increased  significance  to  the 
Copenhagen  declaration  and  would  allow  the 
Community  to  ensure  the  respect  of  the  legal, 
political and moral values to which it is  attached. 
1  Parliament, Council and Commission. 
2  OJ C 103 of 27. 4.  1977. 
11 Strengthening the protection of 
fundamental rights in  the  Community 
15.  Accession  of the  Community to  the  ECHR 
would  clarify  the  position  of  its  legal  acts  in 
relation to the ECHR and give them a satisfactory 
status; for it is  more logical to enable a complaint 
for  violation  of  fundamental  rights  to  be  made 
directly against such acts under the conditions laid 
down in the ECHR rather than merely by means of 
an  attack  upo(l  the  relevant  implementing 
measures taken by the Member States; this would 
then make possible genuine adversary proceedings 
in  which  the  Community itself could participate. 
The  accession  of the  Community  to  the  ECHR 
would moreover restore the legal position in which 
the nationals of Member States  found themselves 
before  the  transfer  of  certain  powers  to  the 
Community. 
Accession would at least partly satisfy the demand, 
voiced  for  some  time,  that a  written catalogue of 
fundamental  rights,  binding  on  the  Community, 
should  be  established.  It  is  true  that  the  rights 
contained in  the Convention and in the additional 
Protocols do not cover all  the fundamental rights 
which might possibly be pertinent to the activities 
of the Community. The majority of these rights are 
nevertheless  important  for  the  Community  also. 
These rights will  be guaranteed by a written legal 
act providing clear criteria known beforehand by 
individuals and the institutions. 
Strengthening of institutions 
16.  Accession  of  the  Community  to  an 
international  mechanism  of  legal  control  would 
underline its own personality. 
Accession  to  the  Convention  would  enable  the 
Community,  when  confronted  with  criticism 
concerning  the  gaps  which  exist  as  regards 
fundamental rights,  to point not only to the very 
progressive case  law  of the  Court of Justice,  but 
also to its  formal commitments within the ECHR. 
The  Community  would  show  its  willingness  to 
meet  all  objections  calling  into  question  the 
compatibility of its acts with fundamental rights. 
Finally, accession would reduce the risk of national 
courts using the absence of a written catalogue of 
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fundamental  rights  formally  binding  upon  the 
Community as  justification  for  reviewing  acts  of 
the  Council  or  the  Commission  by  reference  to 
their national constitutions, and possibly declaring 
them  inapplicable  in  the  light  of  those 
constitutions,  thus  violating  the  principle  of  the 
uniformity of Community law. 
Arguments against accession 
Need for own catalogue of rights 
17.  It has  been  contended that the fundamental 
rights contained in the ECHR are not relevant for 
the Community and that, accordingly, the idea of 
accession can serve only as  an alibi for  failure  to 
tackle  .the  real  problem:  the  preparation  and 
adoption of a  catalogue specially  adapted to the 
requirements of the Community. 
The  catalogue  in  the  ECHR  is  by  no  means 
irrelevant to the  Community's needs 1  but at the 
same time it cannot be  said  to be  adapted to the 
requirements of the Community on all  points. On 
this  matter,  however,  it has already been pointed 
out  in  the  introduction  that  the  chances  of 
agreeing, within a reasonable period of time, on a 
catalogue specifically designed for the Community, 
in particular as  regards economic and social rights, 
remain  slight.  The  Community  should  therefore 
adhere  to  the  Convention  with  the  intention  of 
working  actively  to  enlarge  and  reinforce  the 
human rights enshrined therein. 
As  has  already  been  pointed  out  above,  the 
accession of the  Community to the  ECHR in  no 
way  precludes  the  eventual  preparation  of  a 
specific  Community catalogue going beyond what 
is  required by the Convention. 
The  Community and the rights set out 
in the  Convention 
18.  It  is  correct  that  the  ECHR  is  concerned 
more with the traditional freedoms  than with the 
economic  and  social  rights  which  are  more 
t  Point 18. 
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traditional  freedoms  are  also  important  for  the 
Community and, furthermore, the Convention and 
its  additional  protocols  do  contain  a  number of 
economic and social  rights.  In  terms  of potential 
significance, the most important probably are the 
right to respect for  private and family  life,  home 
and correspondence (Article 8).  These rights could 
be of significance not only in connection with rules 
on competition and prices,  but also in relation to 
provisions which restrict unreasonably the right of 
migrant workers  and members of their family  to 
live  together.  As  regards  freedom  of religion  and 
association, there are already pertinent examples in 
the  case  law  of  the  Court 1  and  not  much 
imagination  is  needed  to see  that problems could 
also  arise  with regard  to  the  general  freedom  to 
hold  opmwns  and  to  receive  and  impart 
information  and  ideas  (Article  10).  Article  10 
could  play  a  role  in  connection  with  both 
competition  law  and  rules  on  the  movement  of 
goods;  moreover,  it  has  a  not  inconsiderable 
bearing on the relationship of the Community and 
its employees. 
The procedural guarantees provided for in Article 
6 could be relevant to the procedures by which the 
Community imposes  sanctions.  Moreover,  just as 
it has already been faced with the ne bis  in  idem 2 
problem,  the  Community  could  equally  one  day 
find itself confronted with the nulla poena sine lege 
rule embodied in Article 7 of the ECHR. 
The right to form any type of peaceful association 
or  trade  union  (Article  11)  is  without doubt  an 
economic  fundamental  right  of  considerable 
significance. The first Additional Protocol concerns 
the  protection  of  property  and  the  right  to 
education; the latter has become of concern to the 
Community  in  Cases  9/74 3  and  68/74 4  in 
connection  with  the  equal  treatment  of  the 
children  of  migrant  workers.  Finally,  there  are 
embodied in the fourth Additional Protocol rights 
concerning  the  free  movement of persons  which 
are  of particular significance  for  the  activities  ot 
the Community. 
The often heard claim  that the  ECHR is  only of 
marginal  interest  for  the  activities  of  the 
Community  therefore  appears,  all  things 
considered,  to  be  incorrect.  Moreover,  in  the 
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future,  it cannot be  excluded that initiatives  may 
be  taken  to  strengthen  the  position  of  the 
European  citizen  in  the  field  of  economic  and 
social rights. 
Problems involved in  fulfilling  the 
obligations arising  from  the  Convention 
19.  It has  also  been  maintained  that,  from  the 
point of view both of the substance of the rights it 
contains and of the procedures it provides for, the 
ECHR  is  clearly  intended  for  participation  by 
sovereign States and that certain of the obligations 
which  it  imposes  could  not  be  fulfilled  by  the 
Community in its present form. 
20.  It  is  true  that  both  in  the  way  that  it  is 
drafted and in  its  origins,  the ECHR is  intended 
for  participation  only  by  sovereign  States. 
Provisions such as Articles 10, 11, 17, 28, 30, 31 
or 64, which use the term 'State' (which, however, 
is  used in the Convention merely as  a synonym for 
the  term  'High  Contracting  Party')  cannot  be 
applied  directly  to  international  organizations. 
From a legal and political point of view, however, 
the  Commission considers that this  is  no more of 
an  obstacle  than  the  terms  'national  security'  or 
'economic  well-being  of the  country',  which  are 
used  in  Articles  8  to  11  as  a  criterion  for  the 
limitation of certain  freedoms  by  the  legislature. 
The need to restrict certain fundamental rights on 
grounds of a  superior common interest applies in 
principle to the Community just as  it does  to the 
contracting States. Therefore it should be sufficient 
to lay down in  an accession protocol  (still  to be 
negotiated)  that  the  Convention,  when  it  uses 
terms  relating  specifically  to  States,  also  applies 
mutatis mutandis to the European Communities. 
21.  One  must  take  into  account  the  objection 
that the  Community is  not a  sovereign  State and 
'  CJEC 27.  10. 1976 (Case 130/75 Prais v Council (1976] ECR 
1589); CJEC 28.  10.  1975  (Case 36/75 Rutili  v French Minister 
for the Interior (1975] ECR  1219. 
2  CJEC  14.  2.  1972  (Case  7/79  Boehringer  v  Commission 
[1972] ECR  1281. 
J  CJEC  3.  7.  1974 (Case  9/74 Casagrande v Landeshauptstadt 
Miinchen [1974]  ECR  773). 
•  CJEC  29.  1.  1975  (Case  68/74  Alaimo  v  Pri'fet  du  Rhone 
[1975] ECR  109). 
13 for  this  reason  could  not  fully  exercise  the 
procedural rights embodied in the ECHR. In view 
of  the  necessarily  limited  powers  of  the 
Community in comparison with those of States, it 
must indeed  be  asked  whether it is  right for  the 
Community to seek full  and equal membership in 
all  respects.  In  the  Commission's view,  accession 
must serve  to extend the range of legal  remedies 
available in the event of violations of fundamental 
rights  by  the  Community.  In  other  words,  any 
person who, under the ECHR, has a right to bring 
proceedings  before  one  of  the  organs  of  the 
Convention  should  also  be  entitled,  under  the 
conditions laid down in  the  Convention, to have 
legal  acts  of the Community examined as  to their 
compatibility  with  the  fundamental  rights 
embodied therein. 
As  regards  the  active  right  to  refer  cases  in 
accordance with Articles 24 and 48 b,  c,  d,  of the 
ECHR,  however,  one  must  ask  whether  the 
Community  should  acquire  these  rights.  One 
should at least admit that the  Community should 
be  able  to  exercise  such  rights  in  those  cases 
concerning violations of fundamental  rights  by  a 
State  which  is  not a  member of the  Community 
and where the violation has a  specific connection 
with  the  powers  transferred  to  the  Community. 
Where it is  a question of violations of fundamental 
rights by its  Member States which are specifically 
related to Community law, the Community in any 
event  possesses  adequate  means  of action,  under 
the Treaties' infringement procedures. 
Another  question  is  whether  the  Community 
should also refrain from participating in the work 
of the organs of the Convention where the matter 
in question is  of a non-Community nature. 1 
22.  It has also been claimed that the Community 
in its present constirutional form could not execute 
various  obligations  arising  from  the  ECHR,  for 
example,  the  effective  remedy  requirements  of 
Article  13  and  the  holding  of  elections  at 
reasonable intervals  with a  view to  the choice  of 
the  legislature  (Article  3  of  the  first  Additional 
Protocol). 
•  It is  true that the Treaties provide for no direct 
remedies against legal acts which are addressed to 
an  unspecified  number  of persons.  Nevertheless, 
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Article 13  of the ECHR has never previously been 
interpreted as  meaning that in the event of a viola-
tion of one of the rights embodied in the ECHR a 
judicial remedy must exist against every act, inclu-
ding  legislative  acts.  The  wording  of Article  13 
requires  an  effective  remedy  before  a  national 
authority. As  the Court of Human Rights decided 
in the Golder 2  and Klass 3  cases,  among others, it 
need not necessarily be a judicial authority. 
The possibility of an effective remedy is  sufficient, 
particularly,  in  the  form  of  the  possibility  of 
presenting  counter  arguments  either  to  the  same 
authority  or to a  supervisory  one.  One must,  of 
course,  rely  on  the  totality  of  the  remedies 
available. 
If in this  connection one takes  into consideration 
the  indirect  remedies  available  to  any  citizen 
affected  by  a  legislative  act  of  the  Community, 
such as  the examination of such acts  by  means of 
proceedings under Articles 177 and 184 of the EEC 
Treaty and by  way of the claim for compensation 
under  Article  178  and  the  second  paragraph  of 
Article  215  of the  EEC  Treaty,  no  obstacles  to 
accession  should  arise  from  Article  13  of  the 
ECHR. It should moreover be pointed out that the 
legal  orders  of a  considerable  number  of States 
which have signed the ECHR do not provide for 
direct  remedies  against  legislative  acts. 
Nevertheless, none of those States has considered it 
necessary  to  enter  a  reservation  in  relation  to 
Article 13. 
•  As  regards  Article  3  of  the  first  Additional 
Protocol,  according  to  which  the  contracting 
parties  are  obliged  'to  hold  free  elections  at 
reasonable  intervals  by  secret  ballot,  under 
conditions which will ensure the free expression of 
the  opinion  of the  people  in  the  choice  of  the 
legislarure',  one  may  question  whether  this 
provisiOn  is  satisfied  by  the  Community.  In  this 
respect,  it must  be  pointed  out that  the  te~t of 
Article  3  does  not  require  the  election  of  the 
legislative  body  by  direct  universal  suffrage. 
1  Point 33. 
2  Judgment  of  21.  2.  1975,  Yearbook  of  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights  1975, p.  291 et seq. 
3  Judgment of 6.  9.  1978. 
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the  legislative process  in the Community, there is 
no  doubt that the  choice  of the  Members of the 
Council of the Communities reflects the results of 
free  elections  ensuring the  free  expression  of the 
opinions of the citizens of the Member States.  In 
any case, if there are doubts, it would be possible 
to enter a reservation in this respect, on signing the 
accession protocol or at the moment of depositing 
the instrument of ratification, to the effect that the 
accession of the Community to the ECHR does not 
affect  its  present  institutional  structure.  Such 
reservations  are  possible  under Article  64  of the 
ECHR and have been made with regard to various 
provisions  of  the  Convention  by  almost  all 
signatory States. 
•  Finally, reference should be made to the problems 
which,  in  this  context,  might arise  for  the  Com-
munity from Article  14 of the ECHR. Under this 
provision the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms 
set  forth  in  the  Convention  must  be  'secured 
without  discrimination',  in  particular  discrimi-
nation on grounds of national origin. In order to 
avoid  possible  objections  against  the  preferential 
treatment which  is  accorded  to  nationals  of the 
Member States and which is inherent to the nature 
of the Community, a clarification would probably 
be necessary in respect of Article 14 of the ECHR. 
Risk of disrupting the jurisdictional system 
23.  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  it  would  be 
unacceptable  for  the  decisions  of  the  Court  of 
Justice of the Communities to be subject to review 
by  some other international body. Moreover, legal 
procedures, which  are already lengthy as  a  result 
of the  combination  of national  and  Community 
remedies, would be made subject to further delay. 
24.  On  closer  examination,  there  is  nothing 
unusual  in  the  idea  that  the  decisions  of  an 
'international court' should be subject to review by 
other international bodies. The Community is  after 
all  the smaller entity in relation to the Council of 
Europe.  Its  legal  system  may  in  this  respect  be 
considered an internal legal  system.  It is  therefore 
only logical that decisions of the Court of Justice 
of the European Communities should be treated in 
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the  framework  of  the  ECHR  as  decisions  of  a 
national court. 
25.  The fact  that access  to  additional  remedies 
lengthens  the  proceedings  is  only  natural  and 
should  be  accepted as  a  lesser evil  in view of the 
resulting  improvement  in  the  protection  of 
fundamental  rights.  There is  no reason  to  fear  a 
delay  in  the  execution  of  Community  decisions, 
: since  neither the lodging of applications with the 
Commission of Human Rights nor the bringing of 
cases  before  the  Court  of  Human  Rights  has 
suspensory effect. 
Individual right of petition and reservations 
26.  It has  been  contended that accession  to the 
ECHR would lead to a  real  improvement of the 
legal  protection  of  the  citizen  only  if  the 
Community was  also to allow individual right of 
petition against all its legal acts; it is at present not 
certain  that  such  a  decision  will  be  taken.  The 
Community  ought,  moreover,  to state wh;ther it 
intends  to take refuge  behind the reservations its 
Member States  have made regarding this  or that 
provision and if need be add new ones, or whether 
it is prepared to accept the Convention as it stands. 
27.  If accession  is  to  bring  about a  substantial 
improvement  in  the  protection  of  fundamental 
rights,  it  would  be  desir;lhlc,  if  not  entirely 
indispensable, for the Community to recognize not 
only  the  competence  of  the  Court  of  Human 
Rights  but also  to  allow  the  individual  right  of 
petition provided for  in  Article 25  of the ECHR. 
Without the  possibility  of the individual  right of 
petition  accession  to the  ECHR would primarily 
benefit those States which are not members of the 
Community.  Applications  introduced  by  a 
Member  State  against  the  Community  under 
Article  24  of the  ECHR are  hardly  conceivable. 
One should, moreover, exclude them as Articles 87 
ECSC,  219  EEC,  and  193  EAEC  forbid  the 
Member  States  to  settle  disputes  concerning  the 
application and interpretation of Community law 
in a  different manner from  that laid down in the 
Treaties. 
Accession to the Human Rights Convention should 
signify, as far as possible, that the individual right 
15 of petition  in  Article  25  ECHR be  allowed.  The 
Commission  recommends  this  approach for  both 
political  and  legal  reasons.  It  is  of the  opinion, 
however,  that for  a  transitional period  accession 
might be envisaged without this possibility, should 
the agreement of all Member States to the allowing 
of  individual  petitiOns  not  be  immediately 
forthcoming.  Even  if  the  Community  could  not 
immediately accept the individual right of petition, 
accession would remain an important step forward 
from  the  political  point  of view,  especially  if it 
were  declared  on  that  occasion  that  the 
Community plans to recognize the individual right 
of  petition  eventually.  For  the  citizen  seeking 
justice, there would be an advantage in this at least 
in that the ECHR would then no longer have to be 
regarded  only  as  an  indicator  as  to  the  general 
legal  principles  of the  Member  States,  but  as  a 
legal  instrument  formally  binding  on  the 
Community.  This  would  doubtless encourage the 
courts of Member States to refer  to the Court of 
Justice  of  the  European  Communities  more 
frequently  than  before  questions  concerning  the 
compatibility of certain Community acts  with the 
ECHR. 
It should also be pointed out that the negotiations 
over  accession  and  the  subsequent  ratification 
procedures  will,  in  any  case,  take  a  considerable 
amount of time.  The  possibility  cannot be  ruled 
out  that  during  this  period  the  Member  States 
might reach agreement on the question of the right 
of individual petition. 
28.  Because of the various reservations which the 
Member  States  have  made  regarding  individual 
provisions, upon signature or when depositing the 
instrument of ratification, the obligations imposed 
on them by the ECHR are not uniform. This might 
result  in  certain  Member  States  not  needing  to 
comply  with  the  ECHR  when  fulfilling  an 
obligation under Community law, while others do. 
Depending  on  the  type  and  extent  of  the 
Community's  reservations,  the  situation  might 
even  arise  where  the  citizen  concerned  cannot 
plead the incompatibility with the Convention of a 
national  implementing  measure,  but  can 
successfully attack the Community act underlying 
the measure. 
29.  In  the  Commission's 
divergences  ought  not  to 
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opinion, 
encourage 
such 
the 
Community to enter reservations which go beyond 
the  extent  which  is  absolutely  necessary  having 
regard to its  internal structure. If the Community 
confines  itself  to  making  the  few  reservations 
justified by  its  specific nature, there would be  no 
fear of a conflict between the reservations made by 
the Member States and the position of the former. 
In the example given, the reservation expressed by 
the Member State would, on the one hand, be fully 
respected,  while  on  the  other  hand  the  citizen 
would  be  given  an  opportunity  to  attack  the 
Community  act  directly  on  the  grounds  that  it 
conflicts  with  his  fundamental  rights.  The 
Commission  therefore  advocates  that  the 
Community's reservations in the event of accession 
be limited to matters specific to the Community. 
s.  2/79 Part Three 
Institutional  and technical 
aspects 
Participation by the Community 
in the organs of the Convention 
30.  The  preceding  considerations  have  shown 
that adoption of the fundamental rights contained 
in the Convention - apart from certain clarifying 
statements as  regards Article 14 of the ECHR and 
Article 3  of the first  Additional Protocol - pose 
no  problems  for  the  Community.  Difficulties  do 
arise,  however,  over  the  question  of  how  the 
Community would actually participate in the work 
of the organs of the ECHR. Even these difficulties 
nevertheless  appear  upon  closer  inspection  to  be 
surmountable. 
The  Commission of Human Rights 
and the  Court of Human Rights 
31.  Unlike the Committee of Ministers, members 
of  the  Commission  and  the  Court  of  Human 
Rights do not represent the contracting parties and 
are  not  instructed  by  their  Governments;  the 
members  of the  Commission  and  the  judges  act 
only in their individual capacity. 
Those States  which are parties to the ECHR but 
not members of the Community therefore have no 
need  to  fear  that,  in  cases  concerning  the 
Community, those members of the Commission or 
judges who are nationals of the Member States of 
the  Community  will  unite  in  favour  of  the 
'Community'  argument  by  forming  a  blocking 
minority  or  even  the  majority. 1  For  the  same 
reason,  they  would  not  be  able  to  make 
accusations of 'over-representation' if a member of 
the  Commission  and  a  judge  were  added in  the 
name of the Community as  such. 
There are  therefore two possible  solutions which 
may  be  envisaged  for  the  Commission  and  the 
Court of Human Rights. 
32.  The first solution would leave untouched the 
present  composition  of the  Commission  and  the 
Court in Strasbourg. It can be argued in favour of 
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this arrangement that the addition of a member of 
the  Commission and a  judge in  the name of the 
Community  is  not  indispensable  because  of the 
independent  status  of  the  members  of  the 
Commission  and  the  Court.  In  cases  brought 
before the Court, the judge sitting ex officio in the 
name of the Community could, for example, be the 
national  of the  Member State  currently  chairing 
the Council of the Communities. 
One may ask,  however,  whether such  a  solution 
would not be in contradiction with the affirmation 
of the international personality of the Community. 
Does  not  the  international  legal  capacity  of the 
Community,  in  fact,  require  that,  when  the 
interests and, a fortiori,  the responsibilities  of the 
Community are being dealt with in  the organs of 
the ECHR, an additional commissioner and judge 
be appointed in the name of the Community? 
One can observe, in fact, that although the judges 
of  the  Court  of  Human  Rights  sit  in  their 
individual  capacity  and  not as  representatives  of 
their States, a national judge, that is  to say a judge 
of the country concerned, must sit as  a member of 
the Chamber. 
It would therefore seem unacceptable to opt for a 
solution  whereby  the  Community  as  such  is  not 
represented within the Commission and the Court. 
It must  be  remembered  that the  members  of the 
organs in Strasbourg are  not necessarily  familiar 
with the Community legal system. 
33.  The only acceptable solution is  therefore the 
second one, whereby a commissioner and a judge, 
both  appointed  in the  name  of the  Community, 
would respectively be part of the Commission and 
the Court of Human Rights. Their presence would 
underline  the  autonomy  of  the  Community.  It 
would  be  justified  on  the  same  grounds  as  the 
presence of a national from each country party to 
the ECHR. It is  essential that every legal system be 
represented within the two organs. 
As the members of the Commission and the Court 
of Human Rights act in a purely personal capacity, 
'  The Nine figure  today among the  nineteen  States which have 
ratified  the  Convention;  on  the  completion  of  the  present 
negotiations on the enlargement of the Community as well as the 
ratification  procedures  to  the  ECHR  in  progress,  the  relation 
would be twelve to twenty-one. 
17 the participation of the personalities, appointed to 
the two organs in the name of the Community, in 
the  work  of  those  organs  should  in  principle 
extend  to  all  cases  before  them.  It  would,  of 
course,  also  be  possible  to  restrict  such 
participation to proceedings relating to complaints 
directed  at  the  Community.  This  would  be 
tantamount, however, to creating two categories of 
members  of  the  Commission  and  the  Court  of 
Human Rights,  which would, no doubt, not only 
pose  personnel  and  administrative  problems  but 
might  also  jeopardize  the  continuity  of  the 
case-law.  At  all  events,  the  participation  of the 
'representatives'  of  the  Community  must  be 
ensured  in  the  case  of  applications  directed  at 
measures  taken  by  Member  States  to  implement 
binding Community rules. 
The  appointment  of  these  personalities  would 
require  a  derogation  from  Articles  20  and 38  of 
the  Convention,  which  lay  down  that  no  two 
members  of  the  Commission  or  the  Court  of 
Human Rights may be nationals of the same State. 
The  Committee of Ministers 
34.  Although its  functions are quasi-judicial, the 
Committee of Ministers is  a political body whose 
members  are  bound  by  instructions  from  their 
respective  Governments.  In  view  of  this 
dependence  and  the  allegiance  owed  by  the 
Member  States  to  the  Community,  it  is  hardly 
conceivable that the Community and the Member 
States would hold divergent viewpoints within the 
Committee  of  Ministers,  not  only  when  the 
lawfulness of an act of the Council is  at issue, but 
also in respect of all acts of the Community. 
For  this  reason,  those  contracting  parties  to  the 
ECHR which are not members of the Community 
might  therefore  see  the  Member  States  of  the 
Community  blocking  decisions  calling  into 
question Community acts. Since,  under Article 32 
of the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers adopts 
decisions by a two-thirds majority, there is  already 
a blocking minority with seven votes on the basis 
of the present number of States  members  of the 
Council of Europe. 
These difficulties could be overcome if the Member 
States of the Community and the Community itself 
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had only one representative on the Committee of 
the  Ministers  during  proceedings  relating  to 
Community matters  (e.g.  the current President of 
the Council), i.e. if the Member States were legally 
obliged to withdraw from proceedings of this sort. 
This  solution  would,  however,  reduce  to  an 
abnormal extent the participation of the Member 
States. It would also set a dangerous precedent for 
the  exercise  of  mixed  powers  within  other 
international organizations. 
In these circumstances, it would seem appropriate 
to exclude totally the Committee of Ministers from 
proceedings  relating  to Community matters.  This 
solution  may  appear radical  at first  sight,  but it 
would in no way prejudice the objective pursued 
by means of accession. 
It  should  be  remembered,  also,  that  the 
proceedings  before  the  Committee  of  Ministers 
were  conceived  for  the  case  of  a  Member State 
which  has  not recognized  the  jurisdiction  of the 
Strasbourg  Court.  The  problem  of  the 
representation  of  the  Community  within  the 
Committee  of  Ministers  loses  all  practical 
importance the moment the Community recognizes 
the  compulsory  jurisdiction  of  the  Court  of 
Human Rights.  Such  recognition will,  in the view 
of the Commission, be a matter of course. It would 
even  welcome  it  if  the  Commission  of  Human 
Rights, in every  case where it declares  admissible 
an  application  against  a  Community  act,  always 
referred  the  case  to  the  Court  on  the  basis  of 
Article 48(a) of the ECHR. 
The Convention on  Human Rights 
and the Council of Europe 
35.  The ECHR is  in the formal sense not a legal 
act of the  Council of Europe. It was,  of course, 
drafted within the Council of Europe, and it is also 
true that the Convention makes use of some of the 
organs  of the  Council.  From  the  legal  point  of 
view, however, it is  an independent mechanism. It 
ought therefore to be possible to agree to a deroga-
tion from Article 66 of the ECHR, which provides 
that the  Convention is  open only to members  of 
the Council of Europe. 
s.  2/79 There is  no need for the Community to become a 
member  of  the  Council  of  Europe  itself.  The 
cooperation  between  both  organizations  is 
satisfactory and it is  becoming increasingly  close. 
The  Community  has  already  acceded  to  several 
conventions  of  the  Council  of  Europe  with  a 
content  relevant  to  the  Community.  Experience 
has  shown  that  the  members  of the  Council  of 
Europe  are  as  a  rule  prepared  to  facilitate 
Community  participation  in  such  conventions, 
even  if  this  calls  for  certain  changes  to  existing 
conventions. 
Election procedures 
The  Commission of Human Rights 
36.  Pursuant  to  Article  21  of  the  ECHR,  the 
members of the Commission of Human Rights are 
elected  by  the  Committee  of  Ministers  by  an 
absolute majority of votes.  Unlike  the exercise by 
the Committee of its  judical functions which  may 
pose problems, there are no objections of principle 
to allowing the Committee of Ministers to elect the 
'representative'  of the  Community. 1  To  prevent 
the  Member  States  of  the  Community  from 
systematically  overruling  the  other  contracting 
parties during such elections (which could happen 
especially after the forthcoming enlargement of the 
Community), it would appear advisable to provide 
for  unanimous agreement  on the  appointment to 
the  Commission of Human Rights of the member 
in  the  name  of  the  Community ;  in  fact  the 
elections  of  members  of  the  Commission  of 
Human Rights already follow that practice. 
As  regards the preparation of the list of candidates 
provided for in Article 21  of the ECHR, it should 
be  considered  whether this  should  be  left  to the 
Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe or 
whether  a  formula  should  be  sought  which, 
while  maintaining  by  and  large  the  existing 
procedures,  guarantees  an  appropriate  degree  of 
participation  by  the  European  Parliament  in  the 
nomination of the 'Community candidates'. 
The  Court of Human Rights 
37.  Pursuant  to  Article  39  of  the  ECHR,  the 
members  of  the  Court  are  elected  by  the 
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Consultative Assembly  by a  majority of the votes 
cast  from  a  list  of  persons  nominated  by  the 
members of the Council of Europe. This procedure 
could be followed without any particular difficulty 
for  the  appointment  of  a  Community  judge.  A 
derogation  would  nevertheless  have  to  be  made 
from  Article 39, so that the  Community, as soon 
as  it  becomes  a  Contracting  Party  to  the 
Convention, could propose its  candidates without 
being a member of the Council of Europe. 
Preparation  of  the  list  of  candidates  for  the 
position  of  Community  judge  is  an  internal 
Community matter. There would therefore  be  no 
need to include a special provision in the protocol 
of accession. 
The defence of the Community's 
viewpoint 
38.  This,  too,  ts  an  internal  matter  which  the 
Community  institutions  must  settle  among 
themselves.  In  the  Commission's  view,  the 
Community  institutions  should  be  guided  by 
Article 211 of the EEC Treaty. 
Special problems 
39.  Of  the  numerous  problems  to  which 
accession  by  the  Community to the  ECHR gives 
rise,  three  deserve  special  mention :  the status of 
the ECHR within the Community legal  order, the 
effects of accession on the operation of the ECHR 
within the legal orders of the Member States, and 
the question of how to proceed in  cases  in  which 
national  courts  have  failed  to  fulfil  their 
obligations  to make  a  reference  to  the  Court of 
Justice of the European Communities. 
40.  Under  Article  228(2)  of  the  EEC  Treaty, 
accession by the Community to the ECHR would 
mean that the obligations contained in  the  ECHR 
would  be  directly  binding  on  the  Community 
institutions.  Only the Court of Justice  can in  the 
last analysis rule on the status of the ECHR within 
the  Community's legal  order. It is  clear from  the 
1  Point 33. 
19 previous case-law of the Court of Justice 1 that
one must start from the principle that the ECHR is
higher-ranking  within the Cornmuniry than
secondary  Community legislation.
4L. Since the effects of the ECHR in national law
are at present still very varied (they range from the
completely  insignificant to a position of primacy
over national law and even, in the case of Austria
to the position of a constitutional  norm), one must
ask whether the formal incorporation of  the
ECHR into Community law would involve
changes  as regards its effect within the national
law of the Member  States. In the Cornmission's
opinion, this would not be the case. Accession  by
the  Community  to  the  ECHR can have
implications  only for Communiry  law as such'
Additional obligations would arise only with
regard to the freedom of action of the Community
institutions and their legislative and administrative
functions. The position of Member  States while
exercising their own powers would, therefore  not
be affected by accession,  despite the primacy of
Community law over national  law.
42. Under Article 26  of  the ECHR, the
Commission of Human Rights may deal with
applications  concerning an infringernent  of the
ECHR only after all domestic remedies  have been
exhausted.  Since the means of defence against
unlawful Cornmunity acts often consist of  a
combination of national  and Communiry judicial
remedies, the question should be cleared up of how
to proceed in cases in which national  courts of last
instance  have failed to fulfil their obligation to
refer the matter to the Court of Justice under the
third paragraph of Article L77 of the EEC Treaty.
The party concerned cannot himself compel the
court to make such a reference.  Consequently,
Article 26 of the ECHR could not be used against
him personally. The essence and purpose of Article
26 is, however, to prevent a matter frorn being
brought  before the Strasbourg  authorities which
has not yet been exhaustively  investigated by the
competent national  courts. In other words' steps
must be taken to ensure that the Court of Justice in
Luxembourg  is  able to  perform fully  the
supervisory functions  vested in it by the Treaties.
Since it  can hardly be envisaged that the
Strasbourg organs would themselves  refer
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questions to the Court of Justice, it would appear
appropriate to introduce a procedure whereby  the
Community is  obliged, in  cases where th':
compatibility of a Community act with the ECHR-
is in question, .to ask the Court of Justice for atr
opinion before it subrnits its own conclusions  an<l
to  transmit this opinion together with  it,;
observations to  the Strasbourg organs. Thi';
procedure  should be employed both in the case of
clear failure by national courts of last instance  t<r
comply with the third paragraph  of Article 177 oE
the EEC Treaty and in the case of applications b;z
non-mernber countries, which, for their part, whert
they are in doubt as to the conformity of  2L
Cornmuniry act with fundamental rights do nor
have the opportunity to make a reference to th(:
Court of Justice.
Technical aspects of accession
43. As already indicated above,2 accession b)'
the Comrnunity to the Convention necessitatesr
derogation from Article 66 of the ECHR. This
derogation  could be included in the accession
protocol, i.e. be agreed at the same time as the
other amendments which will be necessary as a
result of accession  (e.g. to Articles 20, 38 and 39).
44. The legal basis for accession could be
provided by Article 235 of the EEC Treaty, Article
203 of the EuratomTreaty and Article 95 of the
ECSC Treaty, which enable appropriate  provisions
to be adopted if an action appears necessary  to
achieve one of the objectives of the Community. It
is the obiectives  of the Communiry as a whole that
the proposed action is intended to achieve ; the
activities undertaken by  the  Communiry
institutions under the Treaties could only with
difficulty be brought to a successful conclusion - given the demands  made by public opinion, certain
supreme  courts and leading authorities 
- 
without
effective protection of. fundamental rights at
Community  level, in  conformity with  the
constitutional principles of all the Member  States
of the Community. Such action is moreover in line
1 CJEC 12. L2. 1972 (Cases 2l-24172 International Fruit
Company  v Produktschap  voor Groenten  [1972] 1219).
2 Point 35.
s.2/79with the last part of the Preamble  to the EEC
Treaty and with the solemn declarations of 5 April
1977 and 8 April 1978.
45. The negotiarions  with the contracting States
to the European Convention should take place on
the basis of directives laid down by the Council of
Ministers on a proposal from the Commission.
The European Parliament would naturally  be
consulted after the conclusion  of the negotiations.
In view of the matter's importance, however, it
would be advisable also to consult Parliament at
the start of negotiations, since it has shown a
particular interest in this question all along.
45. As  aheady indicated, the  negotiations
concerning accession by the Community to the
Convention will certainly take several years. The
necessary amendments to the Convention will at
all events become effective only after they have
been approved by the current Members of the
Convention in accordance with their narional
constitutional rules. This means rhat accession  by
the Community to the ECHR will be possible only
if all the signatory States, including the Member
States of the Communiry, agree to it.
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